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BILL 11, THE CANADA HEALTHACT
AND THE SOCIAL UNION: THE NEED
FOR INSTITUTIONS©
BY SUJIT

CHOUDHRY*

This article argues that the debate over the future of
Medicare has been dominated by financial
considerations at the expense of an examination of the
place of supervisory institutions in the health care
system. Supervisory institutions will be of central
importance to the future of Medicare because any
future system will include some national standards,
which, to be effective, must be interpreted, applied and
enforced by institutions of some kind. This article
focuses on two specific institutional questions: the
dismal record of federal enforcement of the existing
national standards of the CanadaHealth Act, and the
pressing need for dispute-settlement machinery under
the Social Union Frameworksigned by Ottawa and nine
provinces in 1999. The article also examines the
compliance of Alberta's Bill 11 with the CanadaHealth
Act.

Cet article fait valoir que le d6bat concernant l'avenir
du xrgime d'assurance-maladie a 6t6 domin6 par des
preoccupations financi~res, aux ddpens d'une
examination du r6le jou6 par les institutions de
contr6le dans le syst~me de soins de sant6. Ces
institutions de contr6le assumeront un r6le central dans
le regime d'assurance-maladie puisque l'avenir d'un tel
syst~me devra inclure des standards nationaux qui,
pour atre efficaces, devront 8tres interpretds, appliques
et mis en vigueur par un type d'institution quelconque.
Cet article vise deux questions institutionelles
spdcifiques: le record deplorable de la mise en vigueur
des standards nationaux existants en vertu de la Loi
canadiennesur la santd par les autorites f6ddrales, ainsi
que le besoin urgent d'instituer un mdcanisme de
risolution de conflit en vertu du cadre visant A
am6liorer l'union sociale pour les canadiens, sign6 par
Ottawa et neuf provinces en 1999. L'article examine
6galement la conformit6 du projet de loi 11 de 'Alberta
a la Loi canadiennesur la sant.
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I. INTRODUCTION: IN SEARCH OF INSTITUTIONS
Medicare has been a source of ongoing controversy between
provincial governments, which separately administer the ten provincial
health insurance schemes that constitute the Canadian health care
system, and the federal government, which provides financial support to
the provinces in exchange for compliance with the national standards
spelled out in the Canada HealthAct.1 Indeed, this spring, two events
thrust Medicare back onto the front pages and into the centre of the
public policy agenda with renewed vigour. The first event was the
passage of the federal budget. 2 Prompted by growing public concern
regarding waiting lists and over-crowded emergency rooms, the federal
government announced a one-time supplement to federal transfer
payments to the provinces in the amount of $2.5 billion. Instead of
welcoming the new federal monies, however, the provinces were
outraged, claiming that the federal initiative was grossly insufficient to
deal with the fiscal crisis that has allegedly engulfed Medicare. Far from
deflecting provincial criticism, the federal budget has had exactly the
opposite effect of precipitating a new round of federal-provincial
negotiations that may yield a new set of principles for Medicare. The

1 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-6 [hereinafter CHA].

2 Canada, The Budget Plan 2000 (Ottawa: Department of Finance, 2000), online: Department
of Finance <http://www.fin.gc.ca/budgetO0/toce/2000/bud2OOOe.htm> (date accessed: 5 July 2000).
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second event was the passage of Bill 113 Bill 11 will permit the
operation of private, for-profit clinics in Alberta. These clinics will be
able to offer services covered by the provincial health insurance plan.
But, in addition, they will be able to offer "enhanced" medical services
on a fee-for-service basis, which may only differ from insured services in
that they are of higher quality, or provided more quickly. In addition to
generating massive public opposition within Alberta, Bill 11 has sparked
a war of words between the Alberta and federal governments regarding
Alberta's compliance with the CRA.
These two events provide a useful occasion to reflect on the
current state of Medicare. What is particularly striking is that the public
debate spawned by each event has been dominated by financial
considerations. There are three interrelated issues here. First, there is
the question of the level of funding for Medicare. Are current levels of
funding adequate? If not, what level of funding would be required to
ensure that the system fulfills its objectives of providing comprehensive
and accessible medical care to all Canadians? Second, there is also the
question of the source of funding. Assuming that more monies are
required, where are they to come from? If the sources of funding are to
be strictly public, should these new monies come from the federal or the
provincial governments? If non-public sources are an option, what kinds
of sources should be considered? Should we encourage private
investment, particularly with respect to large capital expenditures? Or
should we re-open the question of whether patients should pay directly
for the medical services that they receive? Third, there is the question of
distribution or allocation. Once we have identified the level and sources
of funding, according to what principles or criteria should we distribute
medical goods and services? 4
Financial issues have dominated the discourse of all political
actors on all sides of the debate over the future of Medicare. And to be
sure, funding is of fundamental importance, particularly if the federal

3 Bill 11, Health Care ProtectionAct, 4th Sess., 24th Leg., Alberta, 2000 (assented to 10 May
2000) [hereinafter "Bill 11"].

4 Financial considerations are certainly central to the federal funding story. But financial
considerations are also an important part of the debate over Bill 11. One of the principal concerns

with Medicare is that waiting lists pose a risk to the health of individuals in need of rationed medical
treatments. The Alberta government has argued that Bill 11 would alleviate this difficulty, because

the availability of a privately financed option would allow those with the financial means to
withdraw from the public queue, thereby freeing up resources for those remaining in the public

system. As it turns out, the evidence from other jurisdictions is mixed on whether this would actually
occur. See P. McDonald et at, Waiting Lists and Waiting Times for Health Care in Canada:More
Management!!More Money?? (Ottawa: Health Canada, 1998) at 285-86.
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government proposes to create national homecare and pharmacare
systems. But my concern is that the fixation on funding has occurred at
the expense of an examination of the place of supervisory institutions in
the health care system. Supervisory institutions will be of central
importance to the future of Medicare, no matter what scenario unfolds,
because any future system will include some national standards. These
standards, to be effective, must be interpreted, applied and enforced by
institutions of some kind.
Institutions hold a particular interest for me, because I approach
Medicare as a student of federalism. The basic question of federalism is
who governs, or, more specifically, which set of institutions, federal or
provincial, has jurisdiction to regulate a certain area of socio-economic
activity. An analogous question-which institutions should govern

Medicare-is central to the debate over the future of health care in this
country. However, it is a question that has been largely ignored by
politicians on all sides of the debate, the media, and even academic
commentators. This omission is problematic and short-sighted, because
institutions are central to the durability of Medicare. Simply put, without
institutions to enforce them, national standards for Medicare are merely
political platitudes. In this article, I focus on two specific institutional
questions: the federal enforcement of the existing national standards of
the CHA, and the pressing need for dispute-settlement machinery under
the Social Union Framework signed by Ottawa and nine provinces in
1999.s

5 A Framework to Improve the Social Union for Canadians-AnAgreement between the
Government of Canada and the Governments of the Provinces and Territories, (4 February 1999),
online: Government of Canada<http://socialunion.g.ca/news/020499 e.html> (date accessed: 21
June 2000) [hereinafter SUE]. Quebec declined to sign the final document. For the position of the
government of Quebec, see Quebec, Quibec's Politicaland ConstitutionalStatus:An Overview (1999)
at 33-36. In addition to a news release: see Secr6teriat aux Affaires intergouvernementales
canadiennes, News Release, "Joseph Facal rend publiques huit analyses d'experts sur l'Union
sociale" (21 June 2000), online: Secr6teriat aux Affaires intergouvernementales canadiennes
<http:llwww.cex.gouv.qc.calsaic/c990609.html> (date accessed: 25 May 2000), the following
documents, all analyzing the SUF, were released by the government of Quebec in a single
unpublished volume entitled Entente-cadre sur l'Union Sociale (1999), online:
<http://www.cex.gouv.qc.ca/saicindex-etudes.htm> (date accessed: 21 June 2000): A. Nodl, "Etude
gdnbrale sur l'Entente"; A. Binette, "Etude sur le chapitre 1 de l'Entente-cadre (principes)"; J.
Fr6mont, "Etude sur le chapitre 2 de l'Entente-cadre (mobilit6)"; G. Otis, "ttude sur le chapitre 3
de l'Entente-cadre (imputabilit6 publique et transparence)"; A. Gagnon, "ttude sur le chapitre 4 de
l'Entente-cadre (travailler en partenariat pour les Canadiens)"; and G. Tremblay, "ltude sur le
chapitre 6 de 'Entente-cadre (pr6vention et r~glement des diff6rends)." For commentary on the
SUP, see M. Young, "The Social Union Framework Agreement: Hollowing Out the State" (1999)
10 Const. Forum 120; B. Cameron, "A Framework for Conflict Management" (1999) 10 Const.
Forum 129; and K. Banting et aL, "Four Views of the Social Union" (1999) 21:3 Pol'y Options 68.
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II. FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE CANADA HEALTHACT
A. A Legal Primeron the Canada Health Act
Let me begin with a legal primer on the CHA.6 The political
rhetoric surrounding the CHA appears to suggest that it imposes legally
binding obligations on provincial governments that receive federal
monies for Medicare. Since jurisdiction over health care is thought to go
to the provinces under the division of powers, the CHA has accordingly
been portrayed by some as a massive incursion by the federal
government into provincial jurisdiction. 7 The legal situation, however, is
sharply at odds with this picture. The CHA does not purport to legally
bind provincial governments. Rather, it binds the federal government, by
defining the conditions that must be met for federal payments to the
provinces to be legal. The interesting feature of the CHA is that the
legality of federal payments is conditioned upon provincial compliance
with the conditions spelled out therein. The CHA also contains
enforcement mechanisms that are triggered in cases of provincial
non-compliance, which I discuss in detail below.
Why is the CHA framed in this way? There is a complicated
constitutional story here. The starting point is a pair of decisions of the
Supreme Court of Canada and the Privy Council in 1938 which held that
jurisdiction over unemployment insurance rests with the provinces.8
Although rather specific in focus, the judgments also contain broader
language that suggests that publicly operated insurance schemes which
seek to safeguard persons against the risk of illness or poverty lie outside
federal jurisdiction. 9 As a consequence, the conventional wisdom is that
6 In this paragraph, I follow S. Choudhry, "The Enforcement of the CHA" (1996) 41 McGill
L.J. 461 at 461-76 [hereinafter "Enforcement of the CHA"].
7 Former federal health minister Monique Begin later recalled that during the drafting of the
CHA, "[j]ust before the Committee meetings started, I had a meeting [on 20 January 1984] with the
Quebec Minister of Health, Pierre-Marc Johnson ... [M]y provincial colleague began by declaring
the project unconstitutional": see M. B6gin, Medicare: Canada'sRight to Health (Ottawa: Optimum,
1988) at 163-65.
8 Canada (A.G.) v. Ontario (A.G.), [1936] S.C.R. 427 (Reference re The Employment and Social
InjuranceAct) [hereinafter UI Reference (SCC)]; and Canada (A.G.) v. Ontario (A.G.), [1937] A.C.
355 (P.C.) (Reference re The Employment and Social InsuranceAct, 1935) at 686 [hereinafter U!
Reference (PC)]
9 Thus, in the UI Reference (SCC), supra note 8 at 451, Rinfret J., for the majority, stated that
"[i]nsurance of all sorts, including insurance against unemployment and health insurances, have
always been recognized as being exclusively provincial matters under the head 'Property and Civil
Rights,' or under the head 'Matters of a merely local or private nature in the Province."' Later on,
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direct federal regulation of social policy, including health insurance, is
unconstitutional10 It would be unconstitutional, for example, for the
federal government to operate a national health insurance scheme.],
However, these decisions also stated that it would be entirely
constitutional for the federal government to spend monies in areas of
provincial jurisdiction by making transfer payments to provinces, and by
attaching conditions to those funds. 1 2 The rather obvious concern raised
by these holdings is that conditional grants to the provinces allow the

federal government to indirectly regulate social policy through the use of
financial incentives, an end they are constitutionally precluded from
achieving directly through legislative or "coercive" means. As well, as
Andrew Petter has argued, this distinction finds little support in the text
in the same judgment, he stated that the federal act at issue was ultra vires, because it was in relation
to, interalia, "insurance against unemployment, for aid to unemployed persons, or other forms of
social insurance and security" [emphasis added], which were "subject-matters falling with the
legislative authority of the provinces": ibid. at 454. At the Privy Council, Lord Atkin in UI Reference
(PC), supra note 8 at 365 came to the same conclusion: "There can be no doubt that, prima facie,
provisions as to insurance of this kind, especially where they affect the contract of employment, fall
within the class of property and civil rights in the Province, and would be within the exclusive
competence of the Provincial Legislature."
10 See, for example, A. Petter, "Federalism and the Myth of the Federal Spending Power"
(1989) 68 Can. Bar Rev. 448 at 452 (education, health "and other social services" all fall within
provincial jurisdiction).
11 P.W. Hogg, ConstitutionalLaw of Canada, 4th ed. looseleaf (Toronto: Carswell, 1996) at
6.8(a).
12 This possibility was spelled out in some detail in UI Reference (SCC), supra note 8 at 457,
and UIReference (PC),supra note 8 at 366. The constitutionality of the federal spending power was
recently confirmed by the Supreme Court in the Reference Re CanadaAssistance Plan, [1991] 2
S.C.R. 525 [hereinafter CAP Reference], where it fell to the court to assess the constitutionality of a
federal statute that reduced the level of federal contributions under the CanadaAssistance Plan,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-1 [hereinafter CAP]. The attorney general of Manitoba argued that Parliament
lacked jurisdiction to amend the CAP, because that statute intruded on provincial jurisdiction over
social policy. The Court rejected this argument in CAP Reference, supra at 567:
The written argument of the Attorney General of Manitoba was that the legislation
"amounts to" regulation of a matter outside federal authority. I disagree. The Agreement
under the Plan set up an open-ended cost-sharing scheme, which left it to British
Columbia to decide which programmes it would establish and fund. The simple
withholding of federal money which had previously been granted to fund a matter within
provincial jurisdiction does not amount to the regulation of that matter. Still less is this so
where, as in this case, the new legislation simply limits the growth of federal
contributions. In oral argument, counsel said that the Government ExpendituresRestraint
Act "impacts upon [a] constitutional interest" outside the jurisdiction of Parliament. That
is no doubt true, but it does not make the Act ultra vires. "Impact" with nothing more is
clearly not enough to find that a statute encroaches upon the jurisdiction of the other
level of government.
The Court recently confirmed the constitutionality of the federal spending power in Eldridge v.
British Columbia (A.G.), [197] 3 S.C.R. 624 at 647.
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of the ConstitutionAct, 1867,13 which allocates jurisdiction not on the
basis of policy instruments, but rather on the basis of subject-matter, a

point relied on by the Supreme Court itself in the context of jurisdiction
to implement international treaties and Crown immunity. 14 Petter has

also argued that in addition to resting on a weak doctrinal foundation,
the federal spending power runs counter to important constitutional

values, for example, because it allows national majorities to determine
policy in areas of provincial jurisdiction, and because it weakens the lines
of political accountability by divorcing jurisdiction over policy areas from
control over policy outcomes. 15 By and large, the courts have been
unsympathetic to these criticisms, responding to them by drawing fairly
questionable distinctions between legislative activity on the one hand,
and spending on the other, and ignoring altogether the arguable tension
between the spending power and important constitutional values.16 And

as it turns out, conditional grants have been an extremely effective policy
instrument. The end result is that the spending power has allowed the

federal government to play a central role in the development of the
post-war welfare state in Canada (now dubbed the Social Union),
although it lacks jurisdiction over social policy. 17
13 ConstitutionAct, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5.
14 Petter, supra note 10 at 456-57. The leading cases here are Canada (A.G.) v. Ontario (A.G.),
[1937] A.C. 326 (P.C.) (international treaties); and Amax Potash Ltd. v. The Government of
Saskatchewan, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 576 (Crown immunity).
15 Petter, supra note 10 at 463-68.
16

Porterv. Canada,[1965] 1 Ex. C.R. 200; CentralMortgage andHousing Corp v. Co-op College
Residences, (1975) 13 O.R. (2d) 384 (C.A.); Winterhaven Stables Ltd. v. Canada (A.G.) (1988), 62
Alta. L.R. (2d) 266 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. denied (1989) 55 D.L.R. (4th) viii; and YMHA
Jewish Community Centre v. Brown, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1532.
17 My sense is that the constitutional compromise crafted by the Privy Council has generated a
peculiar political dynamic that we see at play in the debate over Bill 11. On the one hand, Alberta
argues, with some justification, that the federal role in health care is an incursion on provincial
jurisdiction. On the other hand, the federal government argues, also with some justification, that
that role has been explicitly sanctioned by the courts.
Constitutional scholars have generated an extensive critical literature on the federal
spending power. See, for example, Petter, supra note 10; E.A. Driedger, "The Spending Power"
(1981) 7 Queen's L.J. 124; K. Hanssen, "The Constitutionality of Conditional Grant Legislation"
(1966-67) 2 Man. LJ. 191; J.E. Magnet, "The Constitutional Distribution of Taxation Powers in
Canada" (1978) 10 Ottawa L Rev. 473; G.V. La Forest, The Allocation of Taxing Power under the
CanadianConstitution, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1981); A. Lajoie, "The Federal
Spending Power and Meech Lake" in K.E. Swinton & C.J. Rogerson, eds., Competing Constitutional
Visions: The Meech Lake Accord (Toronto: Carswell, 1988) 175; B. Laskin, "Provincial Marketing
Levies: Indirect Taxation and Federal Power" (1959-60) 13 U.T.L.J. 1; W.R. Lederman, "Some
Forms and Limitations of Co-operative Federalism" (1967) 45 Can. Bar Rev. 409; J.E. Magnet,
"The Constitutional Distribution of Taxation Powers in Canada" (1978) 10 Ottawa L. Rev. 473;
F.R. Scott, "The Constitutional Background of Taxation Agreements" (1955) 2 McGill L.J. 1; D.V.
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B. The Enforcement of the CHA" The Ideal
With this brief introduction in mind, let us turn to the dispute
over Bill 11.18 Aside from the massive public opposition to Bill 11 within
Alberta, one of the notable features of the dispute has been the active
role of the federal government. On 16 November 1999, Alberta
announced its intention to allow for-profit clinics to offer insured
medical services; a short time thereafter, Allan Rock expressed concern
in a letter to his provincial counterpart, Halvar Jonson, that such a

Smiley, Conditional Grants and CanadianFederalism (Toronto, Canadian Tax Foundation, 1963);
and P.E. Trudeau, Federalismand the French Canadians(Toronto: Macmillan, 1968). That body of
work has revolved around the question of whether the spending power allows the federal
government to circumvent the division of powers. I am sympathetic to these arguments, but in my
view, constitutional scholars have ignored a logically prior question-why social policy falls under
exclusive provincial jurisdiction. Of course, this proposition is the assumption that underlies the
critique of the generous approach to the federal spending power taken by the Privy Council and the
modem Supreme Court. This question is one which I examine in a work in progress (tentatively
entitled "Recasting Social Canada: A Reconsideration of Federal Jurisdiction over Social Policy.")
If the provinces cannot agree with the federal government on the shape of Medicare in the future,
the courts may have to confront this question as well.
18 Premier Klein's televised announcement of the release of a health care policy statement was
made on 16 November 1999: see R. Klein, TV Address, "Improving Alberta's publicly-funded
health care system" (16 November 1999), online: Government of Alberta
<http://www.gov.ab.ca/premier/speech/healthaddresslindex.cfm> (date accessed: 21 June 2000).
The following day, Alberta Health and Wellness released the policy statement as well as a document
covering questions and answers regarding the statement: see Alberta Health and Wellness, News
Release, "Policy Statement on Health Principles Released" (17 November 1999), online: Alberta
Health and Wellness, <http://www.health.gov.ab.ca/whatsnev/1999%20releases/nov17-99.htm>
(date accessed: 24 June 2000); Alberta Health and Wellness, News Release, "Policy Statement on
the Delivery of Surgical Services" (17 November 1999), online: Alberta Health and Wellness,
<http://www.health.gov.ab.calhealthprotection/questions.htm> (date accessed: 10 July 2000); and
Alberta Health and Wellness, News Release, "Policy Statement on the Delivery of Surgical Services:
Common Questions and Answers" (26 January 2000), online: Alberta Health and Wellness,
<http://www.health.gov.ab.ca/Policy/q&a.htm> (date accessed: 10 July 2000). In response to the
concerns of Albertans, in February 2000 the government released another publication that
answered questions concerning the policy statement: see Alberta Health and Wellness, "We are
Listening: Here's What We've Heard; A Summary of Albertans' Views on the Policy Statement on
Surgical Services" (February 2000), online: Alberta Health and Wellness
<http://www.health.gov.ab.calhealth_protection/index.html> (date accessed: 24 June 2000)). After
tabling Bill 11 on March 2, 2000, the Alberta government outlined its provisions in a news release
posted to its website: see Government of Alberta, News Release, "Legislation Introduced
Prohibiting Private Hospitals and Two-Tier Health Care" (2 March 2000), online: Government of
Alberta, <http://www.gov.ab.ca/acn/200003/8843.html> (date accessed: 21 June 2000). Alberta
capped charges for enhanced medical goods and services purchased in hospitals and other health
authority facilities on 8 March 2000: see Government of Alberta, News Release, "Charges for
Enhanced Medical Goods and Services Capped" (8 March 2000), online: Government of Alberta,
<http:lwww.gov.ab.ca/acnl200003/8863.html> (date accessed: 21 June 2000).
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course of action might run afoul of the CHA.19 Federal expressions of

concern turned into public criticism once the text of Bill 11 was tabled
on 2 March 2000. A few days later, in a remarkable spectacle, Rock gave
a public address at the University of Calgary's Faculty of Medicine,
arguing that Bill 11 would do nothing to reduce costs, cut waiting lists, or
to improve the quality of care. 20 Federal criticism of Bill 11 peaked in a
letter Rock sent to Jonson on 7 April 2000. In that letter, Rock
requested amendments to Bill 11, inter alia, prohibiting overnight stays

in for-profit clinics and the sale of enhanced services in combination
with the provision of insured services, and by so doing, implied that Bill

11 (before it was amended) might not comply with the CHA.21 However,
19 Health Canada, News Release, "Minister Rock Responds to Premier Klein's Policy
Statement on the Delivery of Surgical Services" (26 November 1999), online: Health Canada
<http://www.hc-sc.gc.calenglish/archives/releases/26nov99e.htm> (date accessed: 21 June 2000)
[hereinafter "Minister Rock Responds"]. Jonson replied by assuring him that Alberta would comply
with the CHA (see Alberta Health and Wellness, News Release, "Health Minister Responds to
Federal Government" (10 December 1999), online: Alberta Health and Wellness
<http://www.health.gov.ab.ca/whatsnew/1999%20releases/decl0-99.htm> (date accessed: 24 June
2000)) [hereinafter "Health Minister Responds"].
20 A. Rock, "Canada's Health Care System" (University of Calgary, Faculty of Medicine, 10
March 2000), online: Health Canada <http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/english/archives/speeches
/10mar2000mine.htm> (date accessed: 24 June 2000). In response to Rock's speech, Jonson
initially charged the federal health minister with misleading the public: see Alberta Health and
Wellness, News Release, "Federal Health Minister Misleading Canadians" (10 March 2000), online:
Alberta Health and Wellness <http://www.health.gov.ab.ca/whatsnew/Releases%202000
/rnr10b-2000.htm> (date accessed: 18 May 2000). Jonson subsequently sent a letter to Rock on
March 14, 2000, in which he accused him of speaking on matters within provincial jurisdiction, and
demanded that the Minister state whether Bill 11 complies with the CHA: Government of Alberta,
Notice to the Editors, "Letter to Allan Rock from Halvar Jonson" (14 March 2000), online:
Government of Alberta, <http:/www2.gov.ab.ca/healthfacts /PrinterFriendly.cfm?ID= 143> (date
accessed: 24 June 2000). In a reply dated 16 March 2000, Rock denied intruding on provincial
jurisdiction, pledged to continue speaking out on "health issues which are of such great importance
to all Canadians," and repeated his intention to complete a review of Bill 11 before determining
whether it violated the CHA: see Health Canada, News Release, "Letter to the Honourable Halvar
Jonson, M.L.A." (16 March 2000), online: Health Canada <http:/Iwww.hc-sc.gc.ca/english/
archives/letter_16mar2000.htm> (date accessed: 24 June 2000).
21 Health Canada, "Letter to the Honourable Halvar Jonson" (7 April 2000), online: Health
Canada <http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/english/archiveslletterO7apr2000.htm> (date accessed: 24 June
2000). Amendments to Bill 11 introduced by the Alberta legislature on April 12,2000 included, inter
alia, a strengthening of the queue jumping prohibition, a requirement that "enhanced" medical
goods and services be reasonably priced, and an obligation on health authorities to use existing
hospital facilities efficiently: see Alberta Health and Wellness, News Release, "Government
Introduces Amendments to Bill 11" (12 April 2000), online: Government of Alberta
<http://www.gov.ab.calacn/200004/9004.html> (date accessed: 24 June 2000). The same day, Allan
Rock reiterated, in a letter to Halvar Jonson, that the federal government's standpoint regarding
private clinics being considered hospitals under the CHA had not changed since Diane Marleau's
letter dated 6 January 1995: see Health Canada, News Release, "Letter to the Honourable Halvar
Jonson" (12 April 2000), online: Health Canada <http:lwww.hc-sc.gc.ca/english/archives
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on 11 May 2000, Rock effectively conceded, in a speech to the House of
Commons, that Bill 11 on its face did not violate the CHA.22 I will return
to the question of Bill l1's compliance with the CHA below.
The impression created by the energetic and aggressive federal
stance toward Bill 11 is that bureaucrats in the Canada Health Act
Division of Health Canada are actively monitoring the provincial health
care systems, and constantly assessing them for compliance with the
national standards spelled out in the CHA. Moreover, Allan Rock's very
personal, and very public, involvement in the issue suggests that the
federal government is willing to take the provinces to task for noncompliance with the CR2A and to bear the political consequences of
doing so. In fact, the available evidence points in exactly the opposite
direction. There is a yawning gap between the rhetoric surrounding Bill
11 and the reality of the federal government's enforcement of the CHA.
The truth is that the federal government is largely unaware of the degree
of provincial compliance with the CHA, and, in suspected cases of
provincial non-compliance, has followed the traditional norms of
intergovernmental relations in Canada, shrouding its interactions with
provincial governments in secrecy.
To provide a framework for critical analysis, let us consider what
the CHA contemplates in terms of the enforcement of the conditions
laid out therein. It is fairly clear that the CHA envisages a scheme
approximating the image created by the rhetoric surrounding Bill 11,
whereby the federal government monitors provincial compliance with
the terms of the CHA, and, in cases of non-compliance, moves to ensure
provincial compliance. This conclusion follows from the terms of the
CHA itself. The CHA spells out a public enforcement machinery,
centred on the federal government, or more accurately, two enforcement
tracks, for two different sets of conditions. For the conditions of
universality, comprehensiveness, accessibility, non-profit public
administration, and portability, the CHA provides that provinces "must"
satisfy these criteria in order to qualify for federal transfers. 23 However,
the CHA provides that for breaches of these conditions, the federal
cabinet "may" withhold funds from the offending province, after
/letter12apr2000.htm> (date accessed: 24 June 2000).
22 In lieu of further action against Alberta, Rock simply promised to "monitor closely what
may happen on the ground in private for profit facilities permitted under Bill 11 to ensure that
queue jumping and other accessibility issues do not arise": House of Commons Debates (11 May
2000) at 6670 (A. Rock) [hereinafter FederalConcession]. See also Health Canada, News Release,
"Health Minister responds to Bill 11" (11 May 2000), online: Health Canada
<http:llwww.hc-sc.gc.calenglish/archives/releases/2000/2000_46e.htm> (date accessed: 24 June
2000).
23 CHA, supra note 1, s. 7.
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mandatory consultation with the province. 24 The cabinet need not
withhold these funds; its power to do so is discretionary. By contrast, for
the CHA's bans on extra-billing and user charges, the CHA provides for
mandatory deductions, in an amount equal to the amount of those
charges. 25 Another feature of the CHA's enforcement machinery which
is frequently overlooked is the requirement that the minister of health
submit an annual report to Parliament respecting the administration and
operation of the CHA that documents the extent of provincial
compliance with national standards. The direct role of Parliament in
monitoring compliance with the CHA illustrates the special importance
26
of Medicare.
What would the ideal system of federal enforcement look like?
Surprisingly, aside from the provisions I mentioned above, the CHA
hardly speaks to this crucial issue. However, if we proceed from first
principles, a very general picture emerges. An effective enforcement
scheme would require that an institution be vested with responsibility for
assessing provincial compliance with the standards laid down by the
CHA. This institution could be a government department (like the
Canada Health Act Division of Health Canada), or an arms-length
agency; to date, the federal government has opted for the former
approach. What would this institution do? A large part of its work would
be devoted to gathering information about provincial health insurance
plans. It could gather information in one of two ways. First, it could
receive reports from provincial governments that document, in detail,
their compliance with the CHA. Second, it could gather information
through a complaints procedure, whereby aggrieved individuals, or
public interest organizations, could bring alleged breaches of the CHA to

24 Ibid., ss. 15, 14.
25

lbid., s. 20. In addition, s. 22(1)(c) of the CHA authorizes the federal cabinet to promulgate

regulations that would require, as an additional condition for federal funding, that provinces
provide "such information ... as the Minister may reasonably require for the purposes of the Act": s.
13(a). Only one regulation has been acted pursuant to this provision. That regulation authorizes the
Minister to require that provinces provide information with respect to the type and amount of
extra-billing: see Extra-billingand User ChargesInformationRegulations, S.O.R.186-259.
26 The conclusion that the CHA contemplates enforcement follows not only from its express

terms, but also from the very logic of national standards themselves. As Sopinka J. observed in
Canada (Ministerof Finance) v. Finlay (no. 3), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 1080 at 1125-26 [hereinafter Finlay
(no. 3)], the national standards laid down by the now-inoperative CAP must have had some
minimum content in order for the federal government to be able "to limit its contributions to
schemes that were of the general nature it wished to support." If national standards are to be
meaningful, and if the federal government is to be able to limit its contributions to provinces thatoperate health insurance plans that further its policy objectives, an institution (presumably the

federal government) should ensure compliance with those standards.
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the attention of federal authorities, which could then launch an
investigation.
What kind of information would this institution gather? For
some standards, all that would be required would be an examination of
the relevant provincial statutes and regulations. Universality and
portability fall into this category. However, other standards raise
complex questions of fact that would require the federal enforcement

-

agency to gather information regarding the actual operation of
provincial health plans. Consider accessibility. For provincial plans to
satisfy this criterion, they must "provide for insured health services on
uniform terms and conditions and on a basis that does not impede or
preclude, either directly or indirectly whether by charges made to
insured persons or otherwise, reasonable access to those services by
insured persons." 27 The definition of accessibility clearly contemplates
both financial and non-financial barriers to access. Some financial
barriers, such as extra-billing and user fees, are specifically prohibited by
the CHA. Non-financial barriers would probably include the lack of
resources to meet the demand for medical services, manifested in the
form of waiting lists, as well as geographic disparities in the availability
of medical treatments. Presumably, relevant information would include
patient to bed ratios, physician to patient ratios, specialist to patient
ratios, and the length of waiting lists, among a host of other data. 28
Finally, the federal enforcement agency would need to be staffed with
experts who could interpret this data. Moreover, either provinces would
be obliged to provide this sort of information to the federal enforcement
27

CHA, supra note 1,s. 12(1)(a).

28 Comprehensiveness, which requires that provincial health plans insure all "medically
necessary" services (CHA,supra note 1, s. 9, read in combination with s. 2), poses different
problems, and may accordingly require a different process for interpretation and specification. To
be sure, there are important issues of fact to be resolved. Thus, the assessment of medical necessity
would require, at the very least, an analysis of the effectiveness of certain medical interventions, an
empirical question. However, the definition of "medical necessity" has also bedeviled health
services researchers, health lawyers and bioethicists, because it has an inescapable normative
component: see, for example, E.J. Emanuel, The Ends of Human Life: Medical Ethics in a Liberal
Polity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991) at 139-44; T.A. Caulfield, "Wishful
Thinking: Defining 'Medically Necessary' in Canada" (1996) 4 Health L.J. 63. It may be that the
specification of the list of insured services should be defined through a process that proceeds from
shared premises as to the goals of health care delivery. On the other hand, some have argued that a
list-based approach would be insufficiently flexible to take into account new treatments: National
Forum on Health, Canada Health Action: Building On the Legacy - Final Report, vol 2., (1997)
online: National Forum on Health <wwwnfh.hc-sc.gc.ca/publicat/finvol2/balance/pubpri4.htm>
(date accessed: 24 June 2000). For the purposes of this paper, I would like to bracket this difficult
issue, although in my analysis of Bill 11, I assume that the definition of medical necessity could be
the subject of adjudication.
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agency, or the agency would require both the resources and the legal
authority to gather this data itself.
C. The Enforcement of the Canada Health Act: The Reality
The reality on the ground differs markedly from this sketchy and
idealized picture. In order to get a sense of the nature and extent of
federal enforcement, I have relied on four sources of evidence: the
track-record of the C-A 's enforcement machinery, as contained in the
annual reports submitted by the minister of health to Parliament; reports
of the auditor general on the administration of the CHA; records of
proceedings of the House of Commons in Hansard; and media reports
regarding alleged violations of the CHA.
Let me begin with two facts. The first is that, despite the explicit
bans on user charges and extra-billing-which are remarkably specific in
a statute otherwise marked by its use of open-ended
language-provinces continue to violate these conditions of federal
funding (see Appendix, Table 1, below). Since these conditions are
subject to the mandatory enforcement mechanism, the federal
government is legally obliged to make deductions in federal transfer
payments, and it appears that the federal government complies with the
CIIA. The latest year for which information is available is the 1998-99
financial year (1 April 1998 to 31 March 1999), during which the federal
government withheld $703,950 from Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and
Manitoba. 29 This figure is comparable to the mandatory deduction in
1997-98, $772,000. By contrast, in 1995-96 and 1996-97, the mandatory
deductions were much higher, totaling $2,666,000 and $2,022,000
respectively. The difference can be accounted for in part by large
penalties imposed on Alberta ($2,319,000 in 1995-96, $1,266,000 in 199697) due to the operation of the Gimbel Eye Clinic, which I discuss
below. Overall, the federal government has withheld a gross total of
$252,920,950 from provincial governments that permitted extra-billing
and user charges. Of these monies, though, 96.8 per cent ($244,732,000)
were returned to provincial governments pursuant to section 20(5) of the
CHA, which provides that if, in the opinion of the minister, extra-billing
and user charges had been eliminated in a province by 1 April 1987, the
total amount deducted in respect of extra-billing or user charges before

29 Health Canada, Canada Health Act Annual Report 1998-99 (Ottawa: Supply & Services
Canada, 2000) at 9.
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that date would be refunded. Of the remaining funds ($8,188,950), 43.7
per cent ($3,585,000) were withheld from Alberta.
In stark contrast, the discretionary enforcement mechanism,
which attaches itself to the important conditions of universality,
comprehensiveness and accessibility, has never been used. Juxtaposed
against the active use of the mandatory deductions scheme, a casual
observer could reasonably conclude that the federal government is
actively monitoring provincial compliance with the terms of the CHA,
and has come to the conclusion that provincial plans meet those national
standards. Alternatively, one could conclude that instances of noncompliance have been resolved without the need for financial penalties.
Indeed, Health Canada consistently makes these sorts of claims in the
annual CHA Reports 3 0
However, the reports of the auditor general tell a radically
different story. The auditor general has examined the enforcement of
the CHA on three occasions, in 1987, 1990, and 1999. I focus on the last
report, because it is by far the most detailed, and because it repeats
many of the concerns advanced in the first two. The auditor general
indicated in 1999 that there had been numerous instances of noncompliance in the last five years. Six cases were resolved without the use
of financial penalties; the report did not provide any details. However,
the auditor general noted that there were other cases of non-compliance
that had not been resolved. A number of provinces (which the auditor
general did not name) contravened the portability condition, which
requires that medical services received outside of a province (including
outside of the country) by insured persons temporarily absent from that
province be reimbursed at the same rate as inside the province. The
portability condition was apparently violated by five provinces with
respect to treatment received outside of Canada; in addition, one
province violated the condition with respect to treatment received in
other provinces. The auditor general also stated, without providing any
detail, that "[o]ther examples of suspected non-compliance with the
comprehensiveness and accessibility criteria have been the subject of
considerable discussion between the federal government and the
provinces and territories." 31 These disputes remained unresolved.

30 The 1997-98 report states, in this vein: "[Dluring the year under review, a number of issues
related to possible non-compliance were identified and resolved, while others are currently under
review": Health Canada, Canada Health Act Annual Report 1997-98 (Ottawa: Supply & Services
Canada, 1998) at 8.
31 Office of the Auditor General, Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of
Commons (Ottawa: Auditor General's Office, 1999) at para. 29.49 [hereinafter Report, 1999].
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The most charitable interpretation of the auditor general's
findings to this point of the report is that the federal government has
been aware of the extent of provincial non-compliance, has been able to
resolve some but not all disputes through negotiation, and has been
reluctant to use the powerful financial levers available to it to secure
better compliance. However, the report then went on to state that the
federal government was largely unaware of the true extent of provincial
non-compliance, because it lacked the required information. The root of
the problem was the federal government's approach to information
gathering. Rather than taking an active approach to gathering relevant
information from the provinces-which, as I argued above, follows from
the logic of the CHA-the report stated that Health Canada "has taken
a passive stance." 32 The provinces voluntarily submit annual reports,
which are reproduced or summarized in the annual CHA reports. But as
a perusal of the annual CHA reports reveals, the provincial reports are
rather general in nature, and lack the specific data that would be
necessary to assess compliance with criteria like accessibility and
comprehensiveness. It appears that regulations that would have required
more extensive provincial reporting were drafted in 1984, when the CHA
was adopted, but faced stiff provincial opposition and were therefore
never promulgated.33 Other sources of information are restricted to
"regional staff reports, correspondence and complaints from the public,
newspaper clippings and other media reports." 34 The report did note
that the federal government monitored changes to provincial laws and
regulations, but, as I argued above, some of the funding criteria require
information about the actual operation of health care systems.
Worryingly, these are not new criticisms. In his first report on the
enforcement of the CHA in 1987, the auditor general stated that the
actual operation of provincial plans was not being monitored by Health
Canada. It recommended that steps be taken to do so.35 In his 1990
report, the auditor general noted that this recommendation had not
been adopted. 36 The auditor general made a similar recommendation in
his 1999 report. In response, Health Canada agreed to assess the

32 Ibid. at para. 29.51.
33 IbidL at para. 29.52.
34

Ibid. at para. 29.53.

35 Office of the Auditor General, Report of the Auditor General of Canadato the House of
Commons (Ottawa: Auditor General's Office, 1987) at para. 12.109.
36 Office of the Auditor General, Report of the Auditor General of Canadato the House of
Commons (Ottawa: Auditor General's Office, 1990) at para. 4.176.
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adequacy of its current information-gathering system and to determine
how it can be improved. 3 7 Allan Rock recently announced that the
federal government would allocate an additional $4 million to the
existing budget of $1.5 million annually to monitor and assess provincial
compliance 38 These monies will go toward increased staff and to
developing better methods of tracking information. The details of these
arrangements, however, have yet to be announced.
The general lack of federal enforcement of the CHA is also
evident from media reports and Hansard, although this source of
information is far from comprehensive. Between 17 April 1984 (when
the CIIA came into force) and May 2000, there were numerous alleged
violations of the CHA. Of these, several involved alleged violations of
the prohibitions on user fees and extra-billing (see Appendix, Table 2,
below). In most cases, the federal government did respond to the alleged
violation through discussions with the relevant provincial government,
and/or the imposition of a cash penalty. The most prominent example
here is the dispute surrounding the Gimbel Eye Clinic in Calgary. The
eye clinic is a privately-owned facility which specializes in laser surgery.
From 1989 onward, the provincial health insurance plan covered the cost
of these laser treatments. However, the clinics charged patients a
"facility fee," which was not covered by the provincial health insurance
plan. In a letter to provincial and territorial ministers of health (dated 6
January 1995), then minister of health, Diane Marleau, took the position
that the Gimbel clinic was a "hospital" for the purposes of the CHA, and
that the facility fee therefore amounted to a kind of user charge for
medically necessary services covered by the provincial health insurance
plan, which is clearly prohibited under the Act. 39 The letter imposed a
deadline of 15 October 1995 for provincial compliance. Alberta did not
meet this deadline, and as a result, the federal government imposed a
penalty of $420,000 per month in November 1995. Soon thereafter, the
federal government imposed penalties on Manitoba, Newfoundland and
Nova Scotia. Alberta later complied, in July 1996.
However, the aggressive and public stance of the federal
government with respect to the Gimbel Eye Clinic stands in stark
contrast to the relatively timid federal response to a Quebec proposal in
December, 1990 that patients visiting emergency rooms be charged a $5

37

Report, 1999, supra note 31 at para. 29.58.

38

House of Commons Debates (11 May 2000) at 6670 (A. Rock).

39 Letter from D. Marleau to provincial and territorial Ministers of Health (6 January 1995)
[on file with author].
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user fee. In response to questions in the House of Commons at that
time, then Minister of Health Perrin Beatty "indicated that he believes
that what he is doing can be done within the confines of the Canada
Health Act." 40 However, he did not provide any details. The federal
government made no further public statements on the matter. The
provincial proposal was eventually withdrawn. It is not clear whether the
proposal was withdrawn in response to federal pressure; at the very least,
the federal government made no announcement to this effect in the
House of Commons.
With respect to the funding conditions subject to the
discretionary enforcement mechanism (see Appendix, Table 3, below),
however, the facts tell a different story. As I have mentioned, federal
funds have never been withheld under this mechanism. However, since
the CH-IA came into force, there have been several alleged violations of
these funding criteria. Most of these appear to have generated no
federal response in public. They are certainly not mentioned in any of
the CHA reports. Indeed, this is even so for alleged violations of the
portability condition, which is not subject to the difficulties of
interpretation that bedevil comprehensiveness and accessibility. To be
fair, the auditor general's report does suggest that Health Canada is
aware of the various breaches of the portability criterion; however, if this
is true, the fact remains that these violations are ongoing. There have
been complaints against several provinces regarding the rates of
reimbursement for out-of-country treatment that are lower than
provided for treatment within the province. In two provinces (British
Columbia and Ontario), the question ended up before the courts;
Canada declined to intervene in one case, Collett v. Ontario (A. G.),41 and
in the other, Brown v. British Columbia (A.G.),42 conceded that the
provincial health plan appeared to contravene the CHA, but asked the
court to dismiss the action so that the matter could be resolved through
intergovernmental negotiation. In addition, Quebec does not provide
reimbursement for treatment received in provinces other than Ontario.43
The federal government has taken no public position here as well.

40

House of Commons Debates (20 March 1991) at 18728 (P. Beatty).

41 (1995), 124 D.L.R. (4th) 426 (Ont. Gen. Div.) [hereinafter Collett].

42 [19981 5 W.W.R. 312 (B.C.S.C.).
43 L. Surtees, "Patients to Recover Out-of-Province Costs Under New Agreement" The Globe
and Mail (31 March 1988) A13; "Quebec Won't Join Interprovincial Medicare Deal: Deputy.
Minister" The [Montreal] Gazette (8 December 1988) A5; and A. Riga, "Deal Covering Medical

Costs in the Works With Ontario" The [Montreal] Gazette (15 February 1994) A6.
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A large number of complaints have turned on waiting lists, and
whether the threat they pose to health contravene the accessibility
criterion. The issue has been raised in the House of Commons on several
occasions. 44 In not one case did the federal government promise publicly
to look into the matter. These complaints related to important services.
On three occasions, for example, Members of Parliament alleged that
women lacked access to abortion services, widely recognized by health
professionals as being a crucial component of women's reproductive
health. Other complaints related to waiting times for breast cancer
treatment, hip replacements, and cataract surgery. Similarly, there have
been a handful of complaints regarding alleged violations of the
comprehensiveness and universality criteria. Likewise, these generated
no federal response in public.
What has been the response of political actors, the media, and
academic commentators to the lack of federal enforcement? To a large
extent, this issue has been ignored. By comparison, other issues in health
policy, especially declining federal support for health care, have received
*an enormous amount of attention. The portions of the auditor general's
report in 1987 that dealt with the CHA prompted one question in the
House of Commons; 45 the same portions of the 1990 report did not
prompt a single question. However, the 1999 report did prompt three
questions, although the report was not made into an issue by members of
the opposition. 46 The media coverage has been equally scant.47

44 House of Commons Debates, (11 May 1994) at 4208 (D. Harris); House of Commons
Debates, (10 June 1994) at 5160 (G. Hill); House of Commons Debates, (4 April 1995) at 11484-85
(G. Hill); and House of Commons Debates, (18 October 1995) at 15525 (D. Grey). For further
references, see Appendix, Table 3, below.
45 Ms. Sheila Copps (Hamilton East, Lib.) asked Hon. Jake Epp (Minister of National Health
and Welfare) about the auditor general's conclusion, at s. 12.146 of his report, that the minister was
negligent in not responding to specific requests from Members of Parliament to report on instances
in which provinces violated the CHA by charging user fees. Epp responded that there are no
provinces currently reporting extra-billing, and that the Ministry had made annual reports in
compliance with the CHA: see House of Commons Debates(28 October 1987) at 10484-85.
46 On 30 November 1999, Ms. Judy Wasylycia-Leis (Winnipeg North Centre, NDP)
confronted the Hon. Allan Rock regarding the auditor general's conclusion that "the government
has no idea whether or not the provinces are complying with the Canada Health Act." Rock
responded that "the auditor general has made some very helpful suggestions, all of which we accept
and many of which we are already implementing to ensure that the best information possible is
given to parliament annually from the Minister of Health with respect to the status of the Canada
Health Act throughout the country": see House of Commons Debates (30 November 1999) at 1950,
On 1 December 1999, Miss. Deborah Grey (Edmonton North, Ref.) repeated the criticism leveled
by the auditor general that "the federal government has no idea whether its health care spending
ever makes it to the waiting lines or the emergency rooms." Rock responded once again that the
recommendations were "useful" and were already being implemented: see House of Commons
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Moreover, of the published articles on the CHA in the legal and medical
literature, only two refer to the report of the auditor general, or the issue
of non-enforcement generally. 48
In my view, the federal government's non-enforcement of the
CHA, along with the failure of political actors and the academic
community to highlight the federal government's abdication of its
responsibilities, is a national embarrassment. In this connection, it is
worth highlighting a remarkable statement in the auditor general's 1999
report: "Parliament cannot readily determine the extent to which each
province and territory has satisfied the five criteria [i.e. universality,
comprehensiveness, accessibility, portability and non-profit public
administration] and the two conditions [i.e., the bans on extra-billing and
user fees] of the Act." 4 9 This criticism was offered in connection with the

content of the Annual CHA reports presented to Parliament by the
minister of health. The auditor general's concern (expressed also in 1987
and 1990) was that the reports are fundamentally flawed because they
fail to indicate the degree of provincial compliance. This view, however,
put together with the auditor general's finding that Health Canada really
has no idea of the degree of provincial compliance with the C-!A,
suggests that the CHA is potentially being violated with impunity and
Debates (1 December 1999) at 1991. On 27 March 2000, Ms. Alexa McDonough (Halifax, NDP)
reported that "[a]ccording to the auditor general, even before the federal government cash transfers
for health, the government has never taken action to protect the five principles of medicare. Let me
quote: 'Health Canada does not have the information it needs to monitor compliance with the act.
The only departmental evaluation undertaken was limited, and it was five years before its results
were reported to parliament."' The Right Hon. Jean Chretien replied that in a recent meeting with
Ralph Klein, he insisted that Alberta "would have to respect the five conditions of medicare.":
House of Commons Debates (27 March 2000) at 5254-55.
47

Former federal health minister and Liberal MP Diane Marleau, without explicitly referring
to the auditor general's report, contended in a 13 March 2000 interview that the federal government
has the power to stop Alberta's Bill 11 and alleged violations of the CHA but never passed
regulations to support the Act: see D. Bueckert, "Ottawa Can Stop Alberta: Ex-minister" The
Toronto Star (13 March 2000) A6. Diane Marleau again derided government inaction regarding Bill
11 and other alleged CHA violations in a subsequent interview dated 6 April 2000: see M.
MacKinnon, "Ex-minister Blasts PM on Medicare: Marleau Assails Her Own Party's Inaction" The
Globe and Mail (6 April 2000) Al. Subsequently, federal Health Minister Allan Rock wrote in A.
Rock, Letter to the Editor, The Globe andMail (17 April 2000) A12:
In his report of Nov. 29, the Auditor-General of Canada recommended that Health
Canada strengthen its ability to enforce the provisions of the CanadaHealth Act and
improve on its ability to report on matters relating to the act. On May 11, I announced
Health Canada's intention to devote new resources in order to respond directly to the
Auditor-General's recommendations.
48 "Enforcement of the CHA," supra note 6; and C.M. Flood, "The Structure and Dynamics of
Canada's Health Care System" in J. Downie & T. Caulfield, eds., CanadianHealth Law and Policy
(Toronto: Butterworths, 1999) at 26.
49

Report, 1999, supra note 31 at para. 29.57.
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that this fact is being kept from Parliament. Although politely worded,
the overall message contained in the auditor general's report is damning.
Why the lacklustre federal performance? There would appear to
be two reasons why the federal government has failed to aggressively
enforce the national conditions spelled out in the CI1A. The first is a
lack of institutional capacity. Information gathering of the kind that is
required to gauge provincial compliance with the conditions of
accessibility and comprehensiveness, in particular, requires a serious
commitment of human and capital resources. As I mentioned earlier, an
expert staff, including persons with training in health services research, is
a must.
However, it would a mistake to reduce the federal government's
neglect of the CHA to a lack of resources. The more fundamental
problem is a lack of political will. The auditor general's report made an
oblique yet revealing reference to this problem, when it stated that the
enforcement of the CHA had been tempered by national unity
concerns.5 0 What the report was referring to was a long history of tense
federal-provincial relations surrounding the federal spending power.
Particular exercises of the federal spending power have long been
regarded as federal impositions by provincial governments (although
only one province, Quebec, has ever challenged the constitutionality of
federal government expenditures in areas of provincial jurisdiction). 51
The dynamic of fiscal federalism has also been profoundly affected by
the dramatic decline in federal transfer payments, a point I discuss below
with respect to the SUF. But I can state the basic point here: the
legitimacy of the federal enforcement of national standards has been
diminished along with its financial involvement.5 2 The failure to exercise
its discretionary enforcement power accordingly reflects a loss of
legitimacy and political capital on the part of the federal government.
To be fair, though, Bill 11 may mark a dramatic turning point in
the federal government's stance toward the CHA. The federal
government has responded energetically from the start. As well, insofar
as the federal government has passed judgment on the compatibility of
50

Ibid. at para. 29.50.

51 For a history of Quebee's stance on the federal spending power, see Secr6teriat aux Affaires
intergouvernementales canadiennes, "Qu6bee's Historical Position on the Federal Spending Power
1944-1998" (July 1998), online: Secr6teriat aux Affaires intergouvernementales canadiennes
<http:llwww.cex.gouv.qc.ca/saic/english.htm> (date accessed: 24 June 2000). See also Quebec,

Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on ConstitutionalProblems, vol. 2 (Quebec: Royal
Commission of Inquiry on Constitutional Problems, 1956) (Chair: T. Tremblay).
52 For references, see infra note 66.
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Bill 11 with the CHA, and has made that judgment public, the federal
government's actions are radical and new. 53 But again, it is important to
note that the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE) had
released its own legal opinion on the compatibility of Bill 11 with the
CHA.54 Had the federal government not made its view public, it would
have certainly lost face. On balance, it is fair to say that the experience
surrounding Bill 11 is exceptional, not representative. The federal
government has a long way to go.
D. The Future
What is the relevance of the federal government's nonenforcement of the CHA for the future? My sense is that national
standards are here to stay, and may in fact become more, not less,
important, in the years to come. As I have argued before, Canadians
take Medicare to be constitutive of social citizenship, and are unlikely to
accept a scenario in which that component of Canadian identity is
abolished entirely. If the federal government creates national homecare
and pharmacare programs, for example, federal financial support will
probably come with conditions attached. If federal financial support for
existing programs is increased, the standards in the CHA will remain,
and, indeed, might be supplemented by standards regarding waiting-lists,
as Allan Rock has suggested.55 If federal financial support remains at
current levels or declines, the standards in the CHA may be replaced by
joint federal-provincial standards, as is provided by the CHST, or even
inter-provincial standards, as was contemplated by Tom Courchene's
ACCESS proposals. 56 If private financing becomes a more prominent
feature of the system, standards to ensure reasonable access will be
absolutely critical. And any scenario which involves national standards
by necessity has an institutional component.

53

FederalConcession, supra note 22.

54 J.J. Arvay & T.M. Rankin, "Canada HealthAct and Alberta Bill 11" Legal Opinion, 8
(March 2000) [unpublished, on file with the author] [hereinafter "CUPE Opinion"].
55 A. McIlroy, "Rock Plans Urgent Drive to Overhaul Health Care; Patient Waiting Lists,
National Home Care Top His Agenda" The Globe and Mail (27 January 2000) Al.
56 Federal-ProvincialFiscal Arrangements Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-8, ss. 13(3), as am. by Budget
ImplementationAct, S.C. 1995, c. 17, s. 48 [hereinafter Federal-ProvincialFiscalArrangementsAct];
and T.J. Courchene, "ACCESS: A Convention on the Canadian Economic and Social Systems"
(Ontario: Ontario Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs, 1996).
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A second point is the importance of accountability.5 7
Accountability for performance is an idea that historically has been
identified with the private sector, but which, in the 1990s, attracted
support in public policy circles. As Colleen Flood has argued, enhanced
accountability is a crucial component of any strategy to maintain public
confidence in Medicare, which is the key to ensuring the survival of the
public system. Accountability, at the very least, includes informing
citizens of provincial compliance with benchmarks for performance.
Typically, these benchmarks have been framed in terms of indicators
that measure the quality of care. The Canadian innovation is to frame
performance benchmarks in terms of distributive justice, which, as I have
argued elsewhere, is the best way to understand the national standards
of comprehensiveness and accessibility.58 Examined through the lens of
accountability, the federal enforcement of the CHA is sorely lacking.
The CHA reports contain little or no detail regarding provincial noncompliance. The secrecy surrounding federal-provincial discussions
reflects the norms of executive federalism, which has long been criticized
for shielding public policy decisions from public scrutiny. By comparison,
the auditor general's 1999 report at least gives a vague indication of both
the number and nature of instances of provincial non-compliance. The
system of federal enforcement is in sore need of reform in order to
enhance the accountability of Medicare to Canadians. Can we trust the
federal government to enforce national standards for health care? Until
now, the public enforcement machinery has centred on the federal
government. However, it is fair to say that the federal government has
failed to live up to its responsibilities. It may be time to consider other
options. One option is the establishment of Medicare Commission that
would have a mandate to monitor provincial compliance with national
standards. The Commission would be independent and non-partisan,
and would be insulated from the political pressures that influence the
federal cabinet at present. Information gathering would be active, not
passive, and would include a requirement that provinces provide
detailed information regarding the actual operation of health care
systems. In this connection, the establishment of the Canadian Institute
for Health Information (CIHI) is a positive development, because it may
be able to assist both levels of government in generating the kind of hard

57 C.M. Flood, "Accountability, Flexibility and Integration" (2000) 21:4 Pol'y Options 17 at
17-19.
58 "Enforcement of the CHA," .upra note 6.
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data that is required.5 9 This supervisory body would report directly to
Parliament, and would be headed by a medicare commissioner. The
commissioner would be assisted by an expert staff of health economists
and health service researchers. What is missing from this proposal, of
course, is any reference to an individual complaints process, as well as a
dispute settlement mechanism. I will now address these issues, in the
context of the SUF.
III. THE SOCIAL UNION
A. Moving Away From FederalUnilateralism
My proposal for a medicare commissioner is similar to existing
arrangements inasmuch as it is centred on the federal government.
However, the constitutional and financial context surrounding the CHA
suggests that this sort of regulatory framework for evaluating provincial
compliance may be inappropriate. Constitutionally, the understanding of
the division of powers upon which the CHA is premised assumes a
degree of de facto concurrent jurisdiction (provincial regulatory power,
federal financing power) over large areas of social policy. Both the
federal and provincial governments have a legitimate role to play in
health policy, albeit through radically different policy instruments. An
enforcement regime entirely within the hands of the federal government
sits uncomfortably with joint federal-provincial responsibility for
Medicare. This is all the more true given the policy instrument employed
by the federal government, conditional grants. Conditional grants give
rise, in political terms, to quasi-contractual relationships, because
provinces agree to comply with national standards in exchange for
federal funding. Given the reciprocal exchange of promises of
performance, vesting authority with one party to authoritatively
determine compliance lacks a certain degree of legitimacy in the political
culture of Canadian federalism.
In addition, the financial circumstances surrounding the federal
role in Medicare suggest that unilateral enforcement is not a realistic

59 The Canadian Institute for Health Information, a national, non-profit organization, was
launched in 1994, following its approval by federal, provincial and territorial ministers of health in
September 1992. Its mandate is "to improve the health of Canadians and the health system by

providing quality and timely health information." See Canadian Institute for Health Information,
"What We Do," online: Canadian Institute for Health Information <http:/Iwww.cihi.ca/
wedo/do.htm> (date accessed: 24 June 2000).
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option at present. Given that the federal government's standing to serve
as standard-setter derives from its fiscal involvement, it is material that
that involvement has declined over the last twenty years. 60 The story of
declining federal funding began in 1977, with the shift away from 50/50
cost-sharing to a block grant (the Established Programs Financing or
EPF Grant) consisting of a mixture of cash and tax points, with the cash
component tied to an escalator based on growth in per capita Gross
National Product (GNP). In 1982, the escalator was applied to the entire
EPF entitlement, not just the cash component, making the EPF cash
transfer strictly residual. The escalator was then eliminated in stages,
first in 1986 (when it was reduced to GNP less 2 per cent), then in 1990
(when the EPF per capita transfer was frozen). Finally, the EPF was
eliminated in 1995, and replaced by a block grant for health, social
assistance, and post-secondary education, known as the Canada Health
and Social Transfer (CHST).
The CHST has generated an enormous amount of controversy,
in part because the provinces claim that it radically reduced the level of
federal transfers. 61 And to be sure, the value of the cash component of
federal transfers declined dramatically, from $18.5 billion in 1995-96, the
last year before the CHST came into force (representing combined cash
contributions under the EPF and the Canada Assistance Plan) to a low
of $12.5 billion in 1998-99, a decline of $6.0 billion overall. The
provinces have emphasized this figure. 62 However, the CHST consists of
a mixture of cash transfers and tax points, and over time, the value of
those tax points has increased significantly. For example, between 199596 and 1998-99, the value of the tax points increased from $11.4 billion
60 This summary is taken from Finance Canada, "A Brief History of Federal Transfers"
(2000), online: Finance Canada <http://www.fin.ge.ca/FEDPROVE/hise.html> (date accessed: 22
June 2000).
61 The figures in the following two paragraphs are taken from Canada, Backgrounderon
FederalSupportfor Health in Canada(Ottawa: Finance Canada, 2000) at 5, online: Finance Canada
<www.fin.ge.ca/activty/pubs/Health-e.pdf> (date accessed: 6 July 2000) [hereinafter Federal
Support].
62 The provinces have accordingly called for cash transfers to be restored immediately to the
levels where they stood in 1994-95 ($18.7 billion dollars). According to the provinces, this would
require an increase of $4.2 billion, which suggests that they are relying on the 2000-01 cash base of
$14.5 billion. See Provincial and Territorial Ministers of Health, "Understanding Canada's Health
Care Costs: Interim Report" (June 2000), online: Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care
<http:llwww.gov.on.ca/health/englishlpub/ministry/ptcd/ptcd-doe.e.pdf> (date accessed: 10 July
2000) at 19 [hereinafter Provincialand TerritorialMinisters of Health]. In addition, the provinces
have called for the adoption of "an appropriate escalator to ensure that funding for health through
the CHST keeps pace with the economic trends, social factors, and changing health technology": see
ibid. at 1. At present, CHST levels are set by s. 14 of the Federal-ProvincialFiscalArrangetnentsAct,
supra note 56.
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to $14.2 billion.63 The net reduction over this period was therefore $3.2
billion (from $29.9 to $26.7 billion), not the $6.2 billion reduction in cash
transfers pointed to by the provinces. Moreover, in the 1999 and 2000
budgets, the federal government did increase cash transfers to the
provinces by $11.5 and $2.5 billion over five years, respectively,
apparently bringing total cash transfers to $15.5 billion annually by 200001. Moreover, the value of the tax points is expected to increase to $17.2
billion in 2003-04, and as a consequence, the CHST is expected to stand
at $29.4 billion in 1999-2000, $30.8 billion in 2000-01, $31.3 billion in
2001-02, $32.0 in 2002-03, and $32.7 billion in 2003-04, compared to
$29.9 billion in 1995-96, the last year before the CHST came into force
(none of these figures have been adjusted for inflation). However, it is
important to note that of the new $14 billion in cash transfers, only $8
billion will be added to the cash base of the CHST, and will be ongoing,
which raises serious questions regarding the future stability of federal
cash contributions. Nevertheless, let us proceed on the assumption that
those one-time supplements constitute part of the CHST.
An additional complication is that it is now difficult to gauge the
actual level of federal financial support for health care because the
CHST is a block grant for health, post-secondary education and social
assistance, which provinces are free to spend as they choose. The federal
government has addressed this problem by allocating a portion of the
CHST to health expenditures, according to a complex formula described
in Appendix, Table 4, below. Since the provinces have not proposed a
formula of their own,6 4 I will rely on it here. When these calculations are
performed, federal support for health care stood at $15.7 billion in 199596, declined to a low of $14.4 billion in 1997-98, and since then has
increased, to $15 billion in 1998-99 and $17.5 billion in 1999-2000. It is
projected to increase to $18.5 billion in 2000-01, $19 billion in 2001-02,
$19.5 billion in 2002-03 and $19.9 billion in 2003-04.

63 The provinces continue to question the legitimacy of counting CHST tax points as a form of
federal transfer payment, inter alia, because the tax transfer does not appear in the federal
government's Public Accounts, because it does not appear as an expenditure in federal budgets,
because increases in federal personal and corporate income taxes have offset the tax room vacated

by the federal government in 1977, and because the tax room was originally transferred by the
federal government to the provinces in 1942: see Provincialand TerritorialMinistersof Health, supra
note 62 at 10-13. However, the same report acknowledges that the provinces agreed to the adoption
of the EPF arrangement in 1977, which included tax points as part of the federal contribution: ibtd
at 5. Moreover, the provinces "were not unhappy with the block fund concept (including the tax

transercomponent)": ibid. at 6 [emphasis added].
64 The closest the provinces come to addressing the issue is in a recent report where they

refuse to count federal tax transfers: ibid.
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The final piece of the puzzle is the relative contribution of the
federal government to provincial health care expenditures. The slight
decline in total federal funding has occurred against the background of
increasing health care expenditures by the provinces. According to the
Canadian Institutes for Health Information, provincial government
health expenditures increased from $48.9 billion in 1995-96, to $49.1
billion in 1996-97, to $50 billion in 1997-98, and are estimated to have
increased to $52.8 billion in 1998-99 and $55.6 billion in 1999-2000. As a
percentage of provincial expenditures, then, the federal contribution has
declined and then recovered over this period, from 32.1 per cent in 199596, to a low of 28.4 per cent in 1998-99, and then increased to 31.5 per
cent in 1999-2000. However, federal cash contributions have dropped far
more steeply, from 16.3 per cent in 1995-96 to a low of 10.1 per cent in
1998-99, and climbed back to 13.3 per cent in 1999-2000. It is these
declining relative levels of federal cash transfers that have led to a loss of
moral authority and financial leverage on the part of the federal
government with respect to the enforcement of the national standards in
the CHA.
B. The Social Union Framework Agreement
Prior to the current round of discussions on health care, a
number of these concerns had already been raised by the provinces, and
led to a set of federal-provincial negotiations that culminated in the
SUF. Although the negotiations were prompted by the decline in federal
financial support, it is important to recognize that other considerations
were at play as well. The provinces were still bitter over the manner in
which the CHST was introduced, accusing the federal government of
having acted unilaterally, without prior notice or consultation.
Moreover, the provinces had relied detrimentally on past promises of
federal financial support, because they had been induced to create
provincial programs, and,. notwithstanding declining federal monies,
were obliged as a condition of receiving federal funds both to continue
those programs and to meet national standards. Additionally, recent
initiatives, such as the Millennium Scholarship Fund, suggested that the
federal government would expend new monies on direct federal
initiatives instead of restoring federal transfer payments. The provinces
called for a variety of measures, including provincial consent to the
introduction of new shared cost programs; stable and adequate funding
with a long-term commitment from the federal government, the right to
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opt-out with compensation, Ala Meech and Charlottetown, 6S and even

the devolution of revenue-raising authority to reduce vertical fiscal
imbalance. Lurking in the background were national unity concerns,
such as the need to demonstrate the viability of non-constitutional
options to renew the federation, and a desire to reassert social policy as
an important component of Canadian identity in the face of economic
globalization. 66

65 Proposed constitutional amendments contained in the Meech Lake Accord and the
Charlottetown Accord would have dramatically altered the legal framework surrounding the
exercise of the federal spending power: Canada, ConstitutionalAccord 1987 (Ottawa: Queen's
Printer, 1987) at cl. 7.; and Canada, Charlottetown Accord-Draft Legal Text (Ottawa: Queen's
Printer, 1992) at s. 16. These amendments would have allowed a province to opt-out from shared
cost programs established after the coming into force of the amendment in areas of exclusive
provincial jurisdiction, and to receive "reasonable compensation" if that province carried on "a
program or initiative" that was "compatible with national objectives." These amendments were
criticized by some for not going far enough in disciplining the exercise of the federal spending
power, because they only applied to new and not existing shared cost programs, for example, those
relating to health, welfare and education, because they applied to transfers to provinces, for
example, the CHST, but not transfers to individuals, and because they required that provinces
operate programs that were compatible with national objectives. In addition, Quebec sovereignists
argued that the adoption of the amendment would have amounted to a victory for the federal
government, because it formally recognized the existence of the federal spending power.
Conversely, some argued that the amendments attached too many restrictions on the exercise of the
federal spending power, because they would have made it extremely difficult for the federal
government to introduce new national programs with minimum national standards, thereby
eliminating shared cost programs as instruments of national unity, and because the threat of
provincial non-participation would have forced the federal government to propose much looser and
more general national standards. For a collection of these views, see K. Banting, "Political Meaning
and Social Reform" in K.E. Swinton & C.J. Rogerson, eds., Competing ConstitutionalVisions: the
Meech Lake Accord (Toronto: Carswell, 1988) 163; R.W. Boadway, J.M. Mintz and D.D. Purvis,
"Economic Policy Implications of the Meech Lake Accord" in Swinton & Rogerson, supra, 225 at
229-32; Canada, Report of the Special Joint Committee on the 1987 ConstitutionalAccord (Ottawa:
Supply and Services Canada, 1987) ch. 7; D. Coyne, "The Meech Lake Accord and the Spending
Power Proposals: Fundamentally Flawed" in M.D. Behiels, ed., The Meech Lake PrimerConflicting
Views of the 1987 ConstitutionalAccord(Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1989) 245; P. Fortin,
"The Meech Lake Accord and The Federal Spending Power: A Good Maximun Solution" in
Swinton & Rogerson, supra, 213; and P.W. Hogg, "Analysis of the New Spending Power (Section
106A)" in Swinton & Rogerson,supra, 155.
66 See generally, R. Boadway, "Delivering the Social Union: Some Thoughts on the Federal
Role" (1998) 19:9 Pol'y Options 37; T.J. Courchene, "In Praise of Provincial Ascendency" (1998)
19:9 Poly Options 30; D. Cunningham, "Ontario's Approach to Improving Canada's Social Union"
(1998) 19:9 Pol'y Options 14; J. Facal, "Pourquoi le Qu6bec a adhrr6 au consensus des provinces
sur l'union sociale" (1998) 19:9 Pol'y Options 12; D. Hancock, "Designing a New Social Framework
for Canadians" (1998) 19:9 Pol'y Options 17; M. Jrme-Forget, "Canada's Social Union: Staking
Out the Future of Federalism" (1998) 19:9 Pol'y Options 3; H. Lazar, "The Social Union: Taking
the Time to Do It Right" (1998) 19:9 Pol'y Options 43; A. McLellan, "Modernizing Canada's Social
Union: A New Partnership Among Governments and Citizens" (1998) 19:9 Pol'y Options 6; K Ng
and D.R. Sloan, "Reforming Canada's Social Union: The Territorial Perspective" (1998) 19:9 Pol'y
Options 23; A. Nodl, "Les trois unions sociales" (1998) 19:9 Pol'y Options 26; R. Romanow,
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The SUF addressed some of these concerns. Our specific focus
here is Article 6, entitled "Dispute Avoidance and Resolution." Coming
into the negotiations, the provinces and social policy commentators had
consistently called for the need to institutionalize federal-provincial
relations in the social policy arena. 67 Unilateral federal enforcement of
the CHA, in particular, was a source of provincial irritation. The
provinces accordingly called for the establishment of dispute resolution
machinery that was impartial. In the end, SUF did not establish the sort
of machinery that the provinces sought. Rather, aside from some
scattered specifics, Article 6 establishes a general framework for the
creation of dispute settlement machinery in the future. Important details
remain underspecified.
What does Article 6 actually say? Signatories committed
themselves to "working collaboratively to avoid and resolve
intergovernmental disputes." In terms of substantive policy areas,
dispute resolution would be applicable, inter alia, to the CHA (although
Article 6 also states that existing legislative provisions will be respected).
Article 6 appears to contemplate three types of processes: dispute
avoidance, negotiations, and mediation. Dispute avoidance will be
encouraged "through information-sharing, joint planning, collaboration,
advance notice and early consultation, and flexibility in
implementation." Negotiations will be premised on joint fact-finding,
which may be conducted by a third party, and which will be made public
if one party so requests. In addition, negotiations may be accompanied
by mediation; again, mediation reports will be made public if one party
so requests. Mechanisms for dispute resolution must respect a list of
general principles; they have to be "simple, timely, efficient, effective
and transparent," allow for the possibility of non-adversarial solutions,
be appropriate for the specific sectors in which the disputes arise, and
provide for the expert assistance of third parties.
It is difficult to get a handle on what specific procedures would
be consistent with Article 6. Indeed, there are many institutional
"Reinforcing 'The Ties That Bind' (1998) 19:9 Pol'y Options 9; C. Th6riault, "New Brunswick's
Perspective on the Social Union" (1998) 19:9 Pol'y Options 20; and F. Vaillancourt, "Alter the
Federal-Provincial Powers Mix to Improve Social Policy" (1998) 19:9 Pol'y Options 50.
67 Canadian Intergovernmental Conference Secretariat, News Release, "Framework
Agreement on Canada's Social Union" (6 August 1998), online: Canadian Intergovernmental
Conference Secretariat <http://www.scics.gc.ca/cinfo98/85007010_e.html> (date accessed: 25 May
2000); J. Richards, "The 'Unholy Alliance' Versus 'Securing Our Future Together' (1998) 19:9
Pol'y Options 40 at 41; KG. Banting, "Social Citizenship and the Social Union in Canada" (1998)
19:9 Pol'y Options 33 at 36; L. Johnson, Behind the "Social Union" (Toronto: Ontario Legislative
Library, 1999), online: Ontario Legislative Library <http://www.ontla.on.calibrary/b29tx.htm>
(date accessed: 24 June 2000); and D. Schwanen, More Than the Sum of Our Parts: Improving
Mechanisms of Canada'sSocial Union (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 1999) at 27-28.
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questions surrounding the design of dispute resolution that remain
unresolved. With respect to the modes of dispute resolution that are
referred to-negotiations and mediation-Article 6 does not address
important issues. For example, Article 6 does not stipulate that either
negotiations or mediation be obligatory. Without such an obligation,
negotiations or mediation may not even be commenced (witness the Bill
11 dispute). As well, the role of the mediator is not addressed. As Guy
Tremblay has written in his analysis of Article 6, in the labour relations
context, mediators can often propose solutions to parties, which may
incorporate the interpretation and application of the relevant legal
materials to the facts at hand.6 8 If a mediator were charged with
producing this sort of report, and if such a report were made public, it
might carry a normative force that compensated for its lack of legal
enforceability.
But the central problem is the failure of Article 6 to refer to
dispute settlement mechanisms other than negotiation and mediation.
The obvious omission is adjudication. The gap is all the more glaring
because compliance with the terms of the CHA is justiciable.6 9 An
individual could launch a court case in which the issue would be the
compliance of a provincial health insurance scheme with the national
standards spelled out in the CHA. Similar litigation occurred with
respect to the now-defunct CanadaAssistance Plan.7 0 Indeed, had the
federal government sought to challenge Bill 11, it could have proceeded
by way of a reference to the Supreme Court of Canada. Alternatively,
public interest organizations in Alberta could still launch a court case
either in the Alberta superior courts or the federal court, although there
are important hurdles to overcome with respect to standing and the
review of cabinet discretion. 71 It is important that adjudication be
available, because negotiations and mediation may fail. Indeed, the
possibility of adjudication may create the incentives for a negotiated or
mediated solution.
What institutions should be vested with adjudicative
responsibility? The options are courts, specialist panels, or some
68 Tremblay, supra note 5. Tremblay refers to a consensus document agreed to by all the
provinces in Victoria on 29 January 1999, which would have made mediation obligatory, and in the
event of an impasse, would have required the report to be made public.
69 In fact, the funding criteria in the CHA have been interpreted in a handful of cases:
Lexogest Inc. v. Manitoba (A.G.) (1993), 101 D.L.R. (4th) 523 (Man. C.A.); and Collett, supra note
41.
70
Canada (Ministerof Finance)v. Finlay, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 607 and Finlay (no. 3), supra note 26.
71I discuss these at length in "Enforcement of the CHA," supra note 6.
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combination of the two. My preference is for the latter option. Both
courts and specialist panels possess institutional advantages over the
other that should be harnessed by any dispute settlement system.
Specialist panels would possess the requisite expertise to engage in the
sort of fact-finding that the criteria of accessibility and
comprehensiveness demand. As I mentioned earlier, a variety of data,
ranging from information regarding cost-effectiveness, to waiting lists
and physician to patient ratios, will play into the interpretation of these
criteria. An additional advantage of specialist panels is the ability to
appoint non-lawyers with expertise in health policy, and with intimate
knowledge of the health care system. Finally, specialist panels can be
constituted from a list mutually agreeable to the federal and provincial
governments, an option constitutionally precluded for courts.
In this scheme, courts would serve a supervisory function, largely
confined to ensuring that the panel system conforms to norms of
procedural propriety. But courts would also be important in securing
access to dispute resolution for citizens. Although I have emphasized the
importance of bilateral mechanisms in light of joint federal-provincial
responsibility for health care, these should not operate to the exclusion
of citizen interests. Medicare is a central part of the Canadian
understanding of social citizenship, and, ultimately, is concerned less
with financial relationships between governments than with providing
high quality medical care to Canadians in the service of fair equality of
opportunity. The constitutionally secured independence of courts would
ensure that dispute settlement machinery would not fall prey to the
political dynamic of executive federalism.
Thus, I contemplate a two-track process whereby either
governments, federal or provincial, or citizens could invoke the dispute
settlement machinery established under the SU. A similar arrangement
currently exists under the Agreement on Internal Trade,72 although it
would be inappropriate to simply apply that model here.73 Under the
AIT, citizens may launch complaints against provincial or federal laws or
practices in one of two ways. A government may act on behalf of a
citizen with whom it has a substantial and direct connection, or if a
government refuses to act on behalf of a citizen, a citizen may act on her
own. Under the latter process, the intergovernmental body created by
72 Canada,Agreementon InternalTrade, (Ottawa: Industry Canada, 1994) [hereinafterA1T].
73 For a discussion of the dispute settlement mechanisms under the AIT, see R.J. Howse,
"Between Anarchy and the Rule of Law: Dispute Settlement and Related Implementation Issues in
the Agreement on Internal Trade" in M.J. Trebilcock & D. Schwanen, eds., Getting There: An

Assessment of the Agreement on Internal Trade (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 1995) 170.
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69

the AIT, the Internal Trade Secretariat, exercises a gatekeeping function
to screen out frivolous complaints. The principal difference between the
economic union and social union contexts is that provincial and
individual interests are not aligned in the latter, whereas they are in the
former. Challenges to provincial measures under the A!T are typically
brought by non-resident economic entities (citizens or
corporations)-outsiders-that are legally resident in another province,
and on whose behalf the home province may have good economic and
political reasons for acting. An outsider, for example, may be a large
corporate entity that employs individuals and consumes services in the
home province. With respect to the CHA, by contrast, aside from
barriers to interprovincial mobility, challenges to provincial measures
will typically be brought by insiders against their provinces of residence.
Other provinces would have no incentive to take up claims on their
behalf, and indeed, in order to protect themselves from claims brought
by other provinces, might act collusively to impede citizen complaints.
Accordingly, citizens should not be required, in the first instance, to
convince governments to bring claims on their behalf.
C. Does Bill 11 violate the CHA? The Need
for Dispute Settlement Machinery
The SUF was referred to by both the federal and Alberta
governments early on in the Bill 11 dispute. Rock invoked the SUF in his
initial letter to Jonson of 26 November 1999, as a justification for raising
questions regarding Bill 11.74 Jonson confirmed that Alberta was a
signatory to the SUF in his letter to Rock of 10 December 1999, with
respect to the S UFs provisions on accountability. 75 However, neither
party has referred to the need for dispute settlement machinery or
Article 6.
This is extremely disappointing, since dispute settlement
machinery would have been particularly useful in the Bill 11 dispute. For
legal scholars, one of the most interesting features of the Bill 11 dispute
is that behind the political rhetoric lies a real legal disagreement. This
disagreement was framed around dueling legal opinions commissioned
by CUPE and the Alberta government on the compliance of Bill 11 with

74 "Minister Rock Responds," supra note 19.
75 "Health Minister Responds," supra note 19.
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the CHA, that arrived at opposing answers to this question.7 6 At its core,
this disagreement turns on competing interpretations of both Bill 11 and
the program criteria in the CHA. The existence of this sort of legal
disagreement, of course, suggests both the potential and the need for
institutions to resolve it.
So what is the legal dispute? Although far from a model of clear
legislative drafting, Bill 11 clearly contemplates that two different
categories of surgical services will be available in Alberta. The first
consists of surgical services covered by the provincial health insurance
scheme. The Act refers to these as "insured surgical services," which it
defines as services that are "provided by a physician, or by a dentist in
the field or oral surgery, in circumstances under which a benefit is
payable under the Alberta Health Care Insurance Act."77 Where can
insured surgical services be received? Section 2(1) of Bill 11 provides
that surgical services, not just insured surgical services, can only be
received in a public hospital or "an approved surgical facility," the
language used by Bill 11 to refer to for-profit clinics. An approved.
surgical facility is either a facility "designated" to provide insured
surgical services, or a surgical facility accredited to provide uninsured
surgical services. 7 8 By implication, it appears that insured surgical
services can be received at a public hospital or a designated surgical
facility. However, there are two restrictions on the kinds of insured
surgical services that can be provided at designated surgical facilities. No
such facility may provide a "major surgical service," to be defined in bylaws enacted pursuant to the Medical ProfessionAct.79 It follows that
insured surgical services that are also major surgical services cannot be
provided at designated surgical facilities, although what a major surgical
service constitutes remains unclear. In addition, only public hospitals
may admit patients for medically supervised stays exceeding twelve
hours,8 0 which suggests that insured surgical services requiring
supervised stays of more than twelve hours cannot be provided by

76 "CUPE Opinion," supra note 54; and J.C. Levy, "Canada Health Act and Alberta Bill 11"
Legal Opinion, 27 March 2000 [unpublished, on file with the author]. Halvar Jonson relied on this
opinion in a news release dated 5 April 2000, in which he reasserted his claim that Bill 11 did not in
any way violate the CHA: see Government of Alberta, News Release, "Bill 11 Consistent with
Canada Health Act" (5 April 2000), online: Government of Alberta <http://www.gov.ab.caacn/200004/8976.html> (date accessed: 22 June 2000).
77 Bill 11, supra note 3, s. 29(i).
78

Ibid, s. 29(b), read in combination with s. 16.

79

Ibid, s. 2(2).
IbiL, s. 29(m), read with s. 1.

80
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designated surgical facilities. With respect to insured surgical services,
Bill 11 prohibits queue jumping, i.e. the giving or accepting of money or
valuable consideration in order to give any person priority for the receipt
of an insured surgical service. 81 Moreover, Bill 11 also prohibits
designated surgical facilities from imposing user charges.8 2
Bill 11 also refers to a second category of surgical services, which
fall within the ambit of a broader category termed "enhanced medical
goods or services." These are defined as "medical goods or services that
exceed what would normally be used in a particular case in accordance
with generally accepted medical practice." 83 The list of enhanced
medical goods and services will be defined by the provincial cabinet
through regulation.8 4 It appears that enhanced medical goods or services
can be provided by public hospitals and surgical facilities designated to
provide insured surgical services;85 it is not clear whether surgical
facilities that have been accredited to provide uninsured surgical services
can provide enhanced medical goods and services as well. Bill 11 accords
enhanced medical goods and services and insured surgical services
differential treatment in two respects. First, Bill 11 contemplates user
charges for enhanced medical goods and services, subject to a disclosure
requirement, 86 whereas user charges for insured surgical services are
clearly forbidden.87 Second, it appears that the prohibition on queue
jumping in section 3 might be inapplicable to enhanced medical goods or
services, because payments for those services would be payments not
"for the purpose of giving any person priority for the receipt of an
insured surgical service" but for the purpose of by-passing the public
system altogether.8 8 Taken together, the legality of user charges and the
81 Ibid., s.3.
82

Ibi., s. 4(b).

83 Ibid, s. 29(0.

84 Ibid, s. 25(1)(g). Note that this provision does not require the provincial cabinet to exercise
its regulation making power in accordance with the CHA.
85

Ibid., s. 5(1).

86 Ibid, ss. 5(l), 5(2).
87

However, s. 5(1.1), ibid, caps the rate for enhanced medical goods or services as "cost plus
a reasonable allowance for administration." This language was introduced into Bill 11 to limit the
price for uninsured services. However, given that the cost of enhanced goods and services will in

part be a function of factors of production that are supplied by markets that are not covered by
public health insurance, this may prove to be an illusory limit on prices.
88 However, s. 3, ibid., does prohibit persons from paying or accepting payment "for enhanced
medical goods or services ... for the purpose of giving any person priority for the receipt of an
insured service," which arguably does extend the prohibition against queue jumping to enhanced
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potential legality of queue jumping mean that enhanced medical services
and goods will be allocated on the basis of ability to pay.
Given that market forces will determine the distribution of
enhanced medical services and goods, what services and goods fall into
that category is of 'ritical importance. Indeed, the central disagreement
between the Alberta and CUPE opinions is the relationship between
enhanced medical goods or services and insured surgical services. To be
fair, Bill 11 is silent on this crucial point, but commentators have been
willing to offer interpretations. The CUPE opinion suggests enhanced
medical goods or services could differ from insured services or goods in
one of two ways. First, they may be goods or services that are of higher
quality than insured goods or services, but which address the same
underlying medical condition. For example, whereas the health
insurance plan may provide a basic hearing aid or pacemaker that meets
the test of medical necessity, individuals may be able to purchase a
hearing aid or pacemaker of higher quality. Second, enhanced medical
services may be identical to insured services in every respect except that
they are provided more quickly than medical necessity requires. The
concern expressed by the CUPE opinion is that the ability of individuals
to obtain more quickly the same services available from the public
insurance scheme would eviscerate the ban on queue jumping. The
Alberta opinion, by contrast, offers a more benign interpretation of
enhanced medical goods and services, by suggesting those services can
only be provided when bundled with insured surgical services. The
textual basis for this interpretation of Bill 11 is a provision that stipulates
that persons who receive insured surgical services shall not pay for
enhanced medical goods or services unless certain disclosure
requirements have been met.89 The implication drawn by the Alberta
opinion is that enhanced medical goods and services merely supplement,
but do not substitute for, insured surgical services.
Which view is correct? To begin, the Alberta opinion is flawed,
because there are other provisions in Bill 11 which clearly suggest that
the relationship between enhanced and insured services and goods is not
one just of supplementation, but also of substitution. In this regard,
subsection 5(5)(a) is quite explicit, because it refers to a situation where
a patient is provided with an enhanced medical good or service because
the normal medical good or service is not available; presumably, if it
were available, it would be unnecessary to receive the enhanced good or
service. It would appear, then, that enhanced goods or services may
medical goods and services.
89 1W, s. 5(1).
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either supplement or substitute for insured goods or services. Does this
mean that the CUPE opinion is correct? In the end, a great deal will
turn on the implementation of Bill 11 through regulations. But it does
seem that Bill 11 is open to implementation in the manner envisaged by
CUPE.
If Bill 11 were implemented in this way, would the resulting
scheme contravene the CHA? The key national standard is
comprehensiveness, which requires that provincial health plans provide
all "medically necessary" or "medically required" hospital and physician
services. Although it is not entirely clear on this point, the CUPE
opinion argues that Bill 11 breaches the comprehensiveness criteria
because it provides that provincial health insurance plan will only cover
those medical goods that are "minimally" medically necessary, rather
than those which are medically necessary. There are a number of
difficulties with this argument. First and foremost, Bill 11 does not
define what medical goods and services can or will be covered by the
provincial health insurance plan. Rather, Bill 11 only defines the content
of enhanced medical goods and services that may be offered outside the
provincial insurance system.
The CUPE opinion, however, offers a more complex argument
that links up Bill 11 with the provincial health insurance plan. Recall that
Bill 11 defines enhanced goods and services as those "that exceed what
would normally be used in a particular case in accordance with generally
accepted medical practice," a phrase that is clearly a benchmark of
medical necessity. Indeed, Bill 11 states at one point that enhanced
medical goods or services are not "medically required." 90 The CUPE
opinion (1) reads back this definition of medical necessity into the
Alberta Health Care Insurance Act,91 which defines insured services as
92
those services provided by physicians that are "medically required,"
and (2) argues that this definition is merely one of "minimal" medical
necessity, which falls short of the comprehensiveness standard in the
Canada Health Act. Let us assume that point (1) is correct. What about
point (2)? CUPE's argument is that the standard of medical necessity
laid down by Bill 11 falls short of the standard of medical necessity laid
down by the CHA. However, the CHA is famously ambiguous on this
point. Although medical necessity is the central concept in the CHA, the
Act does not define this crucial term. I have argued elsewhere that in the

90

bid., s. 5(2)(b)(iii).

91 R.S.A. 1980, c. A-24.
92

Ibid. at s. 1(n).
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face of this ambiguity, "medical necessity" should be interpreted in a
generous manner, to encompass any and all services which restore
individuals to a state of normal functioning.93 However, the definition of
"medical necessity" adopted in Bill 11 is another plausible
interpretation, particularly because it relies on medical judgment, not
cost-effectiveness, as the framework of reference. If that is right, then
Bill 11 may not contravene the comprehensiveness requirement. At the
very least, the point is unsettled. 94 And when interpretive disagreements
of this sort arise, so does the need for institutions to resolve them.95
The better objection to Bill 11 is that the resulting scheme would
contravene not the letter, but the spirit of the CHA. As the CUPE
opinion puts it, "patients with identical medical conditions would receive
different standards of care or different waiting times for care, depending
entirely on their ability to pay." 96 The genesis of public health insurance
schemes in Canada, of course, was a rejection of unregulated markets as
the appropriate mechanism for the allocation of medical goods and
services. Two-tier medicine sits uncomfortably with the moral premises
of Medicare. This is not the first time that events on the ground have
pointed to a gap between the ambitions of and the legal framework
surrounding Medicare. Indeed, the introduction of explicit bans on user
fees and extra-billing in 1984 was a response to the concern that existing
program criteria, such as accessibility, were inadequate means for
pursuing that end.
As well, although Bill 11 may not violate the CHA, it might set in
place a process that will create a state of affairs in Alberta that will
contravene the Act. The standard criticism against the creation of a
93 "Enforcement of the CHA," supra note 6 at 485-86.
94 In this vein, Charles et aL have observed that "the concept of medical necessity has taken on
diverse, implicit, and subtextual meanings over time to accommodate the different policy interests
of specific groups": Charles etal., "Medical Necessity in Canadian Health Policy: Four Meanings
and ...
a Funeral?" (1997) 75 Milbank Q.365 at 367. Included in this list of meanings is "what
physicians and hospitals do," which is roughly equivalent to the standard laid down by Bill 11. For
an argument that medical necessity should be re-oriented away from comprehensiveness toward
reasonable access, and that attempts to define a concise and operational definition of medical
necessity are futile, see J. Hurley et aL, Defying Definition: Medical Necessity and Health Policy
Making, Centre for Health Economics and Policy Analysis, Working Paper 96-16.
95 But even if the definition of "medical necessity" in Bill 11 does contravene the
comprehensiveness requirement, it does not follow that Alberta's health care system has violated
the CHA. What counts in the end is the list of covered services and goods on the provincial health
insurance scheme. Bill 11 does not purport to amend this list. If, for example, the list of insured
goods and services exceeds the minimum set by the provincial legislation, and the federal legislation
sets a higher standard that Alberta meets, the CHA would have been complied with.
96
"CUPE Opinion," supra note 54 at 29.
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privately funded health care system that exists alongside and in parallel
to a publicly funded system is that it will siphon off resources from the
public system. A private system, it is argued, will attract the best
physicians, which will increase waiting lists for specialist treatments,

rather than decreasing them. As well, the availability of a private option
will facilitate the exit of the wealthy from the public system, and will
eliminate both their incentive to ensure that that system functions
effectively, and their desire to contribute financially to that system. In
the end, all of these developments would impede accessibility.

Defenders of Medicare routinely present .these factual propositions as
articles of faith, whereas in fact, they are empirical propositions that
must be tested against the evidence. Thus, Bill 11 creates the need for
effective monitoring machinery that can determine whether threats to
accessibility actually materialize.
D. Is the Social Union Framework Dead?
My suggestion that dispute settlement machinery be established
under the SUF suggests that the SUF possesses some normative force,
and for that reason, that governments will seek to implement it. But does
it? I am afraid here that the limited evidence available suggests that the
SUF has not had the domesticating or civilizing influence on
intergovernmental relations with respect to social policy that its framers
envisaged.
Consider two recent examples. The first was the federal
government's homelessness initiative, announced last December. This
initiative involves rather significant federal government expenditure in
an area of provincial jurisdiction-housing. It appears that most of these
monies will consist of grants to local governments and non-profit
entities. The relevant point is that under the S UF, the federal
government was obliged to give at least three months' notice to
provincial governments and to offer to consult with them. It appears that
this term of the SUF was not complied with. Indeed, my understanding is
that provincial ministers with responsibility for social policy were
meeting in Ottawa on the very day of the federal announcement, and
heard about the federal initiative from the media.
The second example, of course, is the controversy surrounding
Bill 11 in Alberta itself. The active role of the federal government masks
the fact that the SUF has played little or no role in the dispute. Under
the SUF, Alberta was obliged to give the federal government advance
notice prior to the announcement of Bill 11, and to offer consultations.
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Neither of these requirements was met. Moreover, as I have discussed,
neither party invoked Article 6 and suggested the creation of dispute
settlement machinery to determine the compliance of Bill 11 with the
CHA.
IV. CONCLUSION
The reform of Canadian Medicare will be one of the dominant
policy issues of the next decade. Canadians are in search of practical
solutions that simultaneously satisfy the constraints of costs and justice,
and which respond to the changing realities of medical practice. My
argument in this paper has been that the role of supervisory institutions
is an additional topic that should not be ignored. The crafting of
supervisory institutions-whether in the form of a Medicare
Commission, and/or dispute settlement machinery under the SUF-must
be responsive both to political realities and to the constitutional
framework surrounding Medicare. But above all, since Medicare is
constitutive of the Canadian understanding of social citizenship, these
institutions must ensure that Medicare is accountable to Canadians.
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NOTES

1 The federal Minister of National Health and Welfare Jake Epp wrote in Health
Canada, CanadaHealthAct Annual Report 1987-88 (Ottawa: Supply & Services Canada, 1988) at 3:
The year 1987-88 has been a landmark in the Canadian health care system. As provided
for under the CanadaHealth Act, by April 1, 1987, all provinces and territories had taken
steps to comply with the extra-billing and user charges provisions of the Act. This report
therefore differs slightly from its previous editions. It no longer contains a table of
deductions made from the federal transfer payments, and it has been amended to show
that all provinces that received deductions in their payments have been granted full
refunds during the year.
2 The CHA annual reports between 1987-88 and 1992-93 inclusive make no reference to
any deductions in federal transfer payments to the provinces. However, the CanadaHealth Act
Annual Report 1994-95 contains three tables of deductions, one for each of the following fiscal years:
1992-93, 1993-94, 1994-95: see Health Canada, CanadaHealthAct Annual Report 1994-95 (Ottawa:
Supply and Services Canada, 1995) at 13.
3 The CanadaHealthActAnnual Report 1994-95, ibid.,
contains the following explanation
at 14:
Subsection 20(5) of the Act provided an incentive for the early elimination of these
charges. A province that ended extra-billing or user charges within three years of the
coming into force of the Act, that is, before April 1, 1987, was entitled to have the total
amount of deductions refunded. All provinces in which direct charges existed did, in fact,
establish or revise laws, regulations or practices to comply with the extra-billing and user
charges conditions by the established deadline. Consequently, prior withheld funds were
paid to the provinces as required under the Act. Any deductions made beginning April 1,
1987 were not to be refunded.
4 'Running Net Total' refers to the sum of withheld federal transfer payments of net
returned monies.
5 This table covers the period from 17 April 1984, when Royal assent was given to the
CHA,to the present. Whereas alleged violations are often described by critics or the media as
engaging a particular principle of the CHA, the listed national standard has been reformulated
wherever necessary to reflect my own understanding of the relevant CHA condition.
6 "Ottawa Withholds Extra-Billing Funds" The CalgaryHerald (27 June 1984) A3.
7 "Medicare Penalties to Begin July 19" The Globe and Mail (6 July 1984) 5.
8 "7 Provinces to Lose Money" The Globe andMail (19 July 1984) 10.
9 "Ontario Gets $115 million for Banning Extra-Billing" The Globe and Mail (14 July
1986) Al, A2.
10 "Deny B.C. $700 million for its Abortions NDP Health Critic Urges" The Toronto Star
(9 February 1988) Al.
11 D. Vienneau, "Health Minister Must Tell B.C. to Pay for Abortions, Critics Say" The
Toronto Star (9 March 1988) A4.
12
House of Commons Debates, (10 December 1990) at 16492-93.
13

Ibid. at 16493.

14

House of Commons Debates, (17 December 1990) at 16822.

15
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House of Commons Debates, (16 September 1991) at 2195.
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19

House of Commons Debates, (19 September 1991) at 2389.
20 Mr. Rey Pagtakhan (Winnipeg North, Lib) later reported in the House of Commons
that on 23 March 1992, Quebec Health Minister Marc-Yvan C6t6 announced that the $5 fee would
not be implemented: see House of Commons Debates, (26 March 1992) at 8833.
21 CBC, "B.C. Gets Fined for Health Violation" Prime Time News (19 May 1994).
22

House of Commons Debates, (20 September 1994) at 5900.

23Ibid.
24

House of CommonsDebates, (28 November 1994) at 8387.

25
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26 N. Ovenden, "Alberta's Not Only Clinic Culprit: User Fees Common in Other
Provinces," The CalgaryHerald (29 November 1994) A2.
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